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	War is one of the major themes in the study of International Relations. Across history it was proven to be the ultimate means of conflict resolution. According to Bull, war is one of the five institutions of his influential conceptualisation of an international society (1977: 127- 161). Hence, resorting to war was considered as a right of every state, constituting the final arbiter of international political disputes. The issue regarding the restraints of war was limited to its conduct (Jus in Bello) rather than its starting conditions (Jus ad Bellum) (O’Driscoll 2008: 22). As Rengger argued: ‘States were presumed from roughly the eighteenth century onwards to have a right of war in defence of their interests, which therefore made the traditional questions of the jus ad bellum irrelevant’(2002: 359). Nevertheless war’s ethical dimension and its respective evaluation evolved through time in accordance with its constantly magnifying horrific results. 
The devastating consequences of the two World Wars shifted interest to the very morality of the initiation of war. Back in 1935, before the even more catastrophic Second World War, Nicholas Politis contended: ‘the conflagration of 1914 forced upon the attention of all the absurdity of the system of the absolute right of war... It showed that for the civilized world, war is too great a calamity to be permitted’ (1935: 8). After a series of initiatives such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg- Briand Pact, war was officially outlawed as it was enshrined in the United Nations Charter. One exception however was recognised; self- defence. States were and still are allowed to use armed force in order to protect themselves and ensure their survival. This seemingly clear exception, however, generates a series of troubling questions. When exactly should states go to war in order to protect themselves? In other words, at what point are states legally and morally justified to resort to war to defend themselves? Does that point lie on the moment after an armed attack has already occurred or is the right time to strike when the threat of the enemy is truly imminent? To take it even further, should states forestall the birth of an imminent threat and act preventively even in the absence of a present danger? (Doyle 2008: 3). 
The aftermath of the unprecedented attacks of 9/11 revived the interest on the issue and triggered a heated debate about the relationship between self-defence and preventive war, culminating on the legitimacy of the 2003 war in Iraq. Preventive war was not a novel concept; it is a familiar one to diplomatic historians, political leaders, international relations theorists, international legal scholars and just-war theorists (Levy 2008: 1). Preventive rationales played a central role in international relations theory, especially realist variants of it (Morgenthau 1948, Gilpin 1981, Copeland 2000). After all it was part of Thucydides’ explanation of the Peloponnesian War according to which the underlying cause was ‘Sparta’s fear of the rising power of Athens’ (1996:16). Preventive thinking was part of the United States foreign policy history (Gaddis 2004, Trachtenberg 2007). Nevertheless controversy was raised when the Bush administration issued its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) where implicitly and under a confusing terminology promoted its right to preventive warfare based on the right of self-defence, arguing that conventional interpretations of the right needed reformulation in order to adapt  to the challenges of our time. This view was backed as well by voices declaring the inefficiency of the UN system since despite its presence its lack of “teeth” did not prevent states from going to war the last roughly 70 years (Anand 2009: 78-82). It should be noted that this approach is quite hasty, for it accounts the efficiency of the system only by the number of wars that happened and not by those that were eventually prevented. Following the same logic, domestic legal systems should be abandoned as well because despite the ban of criminal behaviour and the presence of a strong law enforcement mechanism, crime is far from being eliminated and its occurrence persists.
The central theme of the present dissertation is the question whether preventive war can be legitimised on self-defence grounds. The conceptual compatibility of the two composing notions will be examined in scrutiny pointing to the direction of their parallel and thus never intersecting nature. The analytical method will be largely interdisciplinary meaning that the concepts in question will be approached through a variety of lenses including international relations theory, international law and the Just War tradition along with historical, ethical and philosophical elements. The purpose of this combination is an in depth and spherical apprehension of the particular qualities and attributes of this complex issue.





II.a The Concept of Self- Defence
	Professor Oscar Schachter noted: “When they (states) have used force, they have nearly always claimed self-defence as their legal justification” (1989: 259). Throughout history self-defence is one of the most used and abused concepts relating to the phenomenon of war. Since antiquity participants in wars evoked the rhetoric of self-defence in an attempt to engulf a degree of moral superiority vis-a-vis their enemies. In medieval times, self-defence played a major role in the establishment of the ethical basis of the emerging Just War tradition. It was in the twentieth century, however, where the concept of self-defence gained its central position in the discourse of the use of force in international relations. The rapid development and expansion of positive international law, with the UN charter as its centrepiece, led to the creation of an international system where war and the use force in general, is considered illegal with the sole exception of self-defence. Nevertheless, this widely recognised moral value of the notion and its subsequent desirability led to its systematic abuse by the members of the international community. Every wrongdoer appeals to self-defence no matter how aggressive he or she might be. The argument of self-defence is so appealing that no one is willing to abandon it to the hands of its adversary. It becomes therefore an omnipresent justificatory argument on the use of force. But this does not mean that self-defence applies everywhere depending on whether or not a state claims it. ‘If everything is defensible then nothing is defensible, for an all-purpose concept loses its traction and slides into trivia and tautology’ and eventually its actual meaning fades (Fletcher and Ohlin 2008: 5). 
	This pressure surrounding the concept has a double consequence. First, it is indicative of its normative value and its centrality in the realm of international politics especially when two or more states are on the verge of conflict. On the other hand, it makes absolutely necessary to clarify the specific qualities and attributes of this complex concept in order to clearly distinguish it from aggression and hence decrease the chances of its abuse. A first step towards this direction is the thorough analysis of the very meaning of self-defence. In other words, what exactly is the right of self- defence and what is its content? Despite the differences between the domestic and the international level, an analysis of the concept without referring to its starting point, interpersonal relations within society, would be incomplete and it would not allow us to comprehend the conceptual foundations of this troubling issue. Therefore, this part of the thesis is going to develop in the following way. Initially, the right of self- defence will be scrutinised by analysing its legal and moral basis, then it will be examined how it is incorporated in the Just War tradition and in International Law. However, as mentioned above, there are quite a few differences between the domestic and the international level. Therefore there is the need to clarify that some aspects of personal self-defence may not be applicable at the conceptualisation of self-defence in the international level. The examination of these implications will conclude this first part.

II.b Self- Defence as Exculpation: Justification or Excuse? 
	 The legal notion of self-defence has its roots in interpersonal relations, ‘and has been sanctified in domestic legal systems since time immemorial’ (Dinstein 2001:160). The plea for self- defence in legal terms is a defence against a charge of an offense such as assault, murder etc., leading, if successful, to a full acquittal. This means that above all self- defence is a form of exculpation.  Exculpation is a feature or certain circumstances leading to the cancelation or mitigation of the blame charged to an agent for the performance of a proscribed action (Rodin 2002: 26). There are two kinds of exculpations; excuses of wrongful actions or full justifications. Both concepts may have a similar result, the avoidance of punishment; however they function in different ways. Philosopher J.L. Austin argues that ‘in the one defence (justification) we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other (excuse), we admit that it was bad but don't accept full, or even any, responsibility’ (1956:2). In addition G. Fletcher in his seminal legal work on criminal law notes that claims of justification ‘concede that the definition of the offence is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful’, whereas claims of excuse, ‘concede that the act is wrong but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the actor’(Fletcher 1978: 759). Excuses vary in their form, they span from physical compulsion, duress, necessity and provocation to involuntary intoxication among others and they may mitigate one’s fault for a wrongful action or even completely remove it. In D’Arcy’s assertion ‘the effect of an excusing circumstance is to put the wrongful act ex causa, outside the court of moral verdict at all’ (1963: 81).
	On the other hand, justification carries a higher exculpatory value, for it deals with the rightness of the action itself. A justified action is one that despite being normally wrong, under specific conditions, is either fully permissible or a positive good. It is not a ‘forgivable lapse or a regrettable action that one is none the less excused for performing; it is rather something that one is either fully entitled to do, or not prohibited from doing’ (Rodin 2002: 28). The question that rises is where does self-defence belong? Is it simply an excuse or a justification? The answer is crucial because as it will be shown further below, it plays a basic role in determining the moral standing of the agents participating in self- defence cases. If we take into account the “central case” of self- defence in Rodin’s terms then by that we mean:
 “(i) an aggressor makes an intentional attack on the victim's life which will succeed unless the victim uses lethal force against the aggressor; (ii) the attack is objectively unjust in the sense that the aggressor has no legitimate right to make the attack, for example, he is not a law enforcement officer acting within his duty; (iii) the aggressor is fully culpable in making the attack; (iv) the victim is wholly innocent with respect to the attack (for example, he has not provoked the aggressor in any fault worthy way)” (Rodin 2002: 29).
	With these sufficient conditions self- defence is most appropriately classified as a justification and not an excuse. Indeed, when one kills in self-defence he or she does not commit a murder for which he/she is absolved from liability; on the contrary the defensive motivation of the act makes it fail qualify as a murder in the first instance. Hence, ‘in self-defence we say that the aggressor has been harmed but not that he has been wronged’ (Rodin 2002: 30). Rodin having being influenced by Hohfeld’s framework of rights as liberties also promotes the idea that self-defence as a justification fits in the Hohfeldian sense of ‘liberty’ (Hohfeld 1919). However he is criticised by Fletcher and Ohlin on the grounds that this approach, meaning that ‘neither the original attacker nor anybody else has a right to prevent the defender from using force’ has little to say on the very essence of the “right” of self- defence, for ‘we have an infinite number of liberties, ranging from going for a walk to speaking our mind about public issues to engaging in religious worship as we please’ (Fletcher and Ohlin 2008: 27). In addition, drawing on Aquinas’ “double effect” writings they stress that the proper characterization of self-defence is ‘based not on a right to kill, but on a right to ward off the attack. If the aggressor must suffer as a result, it is a regrettable but unavoidable side effect’. Moreover, based on a Kantian reasoning they claim that the right does not derive from an interpersonal relationship between two specific individuals; the aggressor and the victim but rather from a maximum sphere of external freedom that every individual is entitled to or in other words from the autonomy of every person under the Law (Kant 1996: 230, Fletcher and Ohlin 2008: 28). This Kantian approach has generated a legal discourse in Continental legislations which are quite differently perceived than in the Anglo-Saxon world. Defence in continental Europe tends to be understood as a broader necessary defence of the individual’s autonomy and not restricted only in the case of the “self”. Nevertheless, justification as a liberty in a Hohfeldian framework is better working within a rights-based explanation of self-defence. In other words, the exceptional nature of the liberty combined with its recurring and readily identifiable nature permits it to function as a genuine right within legal and moral normative systems. It does this by demarcating and protecting important interests and liberties of individual persons and providing grounds for future normative deliberation (Rodin 2002: 33).
	The key issue in the right of self-defence is what justifies the moral asymmetry between the aggressor and the defender. Hohfeld and Rodin’s contribution on this topic is more than helpful and it could be summarised as follows: Defensive rights generate from a complex set of normative relationships between four factors: the subject (the defender), the content (the act), the object (the aggressor), and the end (the good or value which the defensive actions seek to protect or preserve). Hence, ‘a right of defence exists when a subject is at liberty to defend a certain good by performing an action which would otherwise be impermissible’. In order for this to be morally justified, we need three conditions to take place. First, there must be a normative relation between the defender and the end of the right, meaning either a right to or a duty of care towards the relevant good. Second, the very act of defence should be proportionate and necessary to repel an imminent threat of harm and lastly the object of the action (the aggressor) must be normatively responsible for the harm threatened (Rodin 2002: 99). 

II.c Self- Defence in International Law
	British poet John Dryden claimed in the seventeenth century that ‘self-defence is Nature’s eldest law’ (1681). It is no coincidence that this concept was fundamental even in the earliest attempts of theorising about war and justice. The idea of a just war and the respective theoretical tradition can be safely considered as the predecessor or the cradle of modern international law. The first traces of Just War thinking can be found in Aristotle who claimed that we may resort to war in order for people to live in peace (1963). Since then, theologians, philosophers and political thinkers agreed that war in some cases can not only be morally accepted but even necessary. The first treatises of Just War were influenced by the Christian tradition. St Augustine in his work Civitas Dei refers to the idea of a Just War which is preferable to an unjust peace (1998). Later on, Thomas Aquinas building on the teachings of Augustine proclaimed three necessary conditions for the existence of a just war; lawful authority, just cause and right intention (2002). Self-Defence is clearly the most prominent example of a just cause in the Just War Tradition. After the establishment of the Westphalian system of states, war and the use of force in general persisted as the decisive instrument of conflict resolution between states based on the prevalence of the notion of sovereignty, allowing Clausewitz to come up with his famous dictum that ‘War is the continuation of policy with the addition of other means’ (1976: 87). 
In the twentieth century however, especially after the horrific experience of the First World War a tendency of renouncing war as an instrument of international politics emerged. The statute of the League of Nations, the Kellogg- Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter above all were created with this objective. Nevertheless, all of these legal initiatives shared a common denominator in reference to the permissibility of the use of force; the right of Self- Defence. This brief historical account of the idea about the justification of interstate violence helps us realise that the tradition of just war theorizing, in the way expressed by Aquinas, served to set the framework for the modern international law and for its development. For ‘fundamental to the tradition was the idea that the relations between states and rulers were not only dictated by power factors, but were also regulated through law such that the exercise of power by states and rulers, always stood in need of some legal basis and justification’ with the ultimate goal of the maintenance of an order of justice among states in the international realm (Covell 2009: 8-9).
In the current international legal framework which is dominated by the authority of the United Nations Charter, the use of force in international politics is prohibited. There are only two exceptions to that rule. These exceptions are the use of force by the Security Council under Chapter VII in case of a “threat to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression,” and the right to use force under Article 51 in individual or collective self-defence. The interest of the present thesis will focus on the case of self-defence.
As it is already mentioned the idea of self- defence as a right is not a novel concept. It is rooted in customary law, general principles of public international law, formal treaties and equally important on the teachings of renowned scholars (Schachter 1989: 259). Self- defence is associated with the survival of the state or at least with the attempt to preserve it. Indeed this is true in extreme situations but the application of the right is in no way restricted only to this kind of apocalyptic instances, for the reality in international politics is more ‘prosaic’ based heavily on considerations about the use of counter-force (Dinstein 2001: 159). The very essence of self- defence is self- help in the sense that under specific circumstances as prescribed in international law a state can unilaterally use lawful force against an unlawful attack. According to Kelsen the reliance on self-help ‘as a remedy available to States when their rights are violated is and always has been one of the hallmarks of international law’ (Kelsen 2006: 339). For Dinstein, self- defence is ‘a species subordinate to the genus of self- help’ or that alternatively self-defence is a legitimate aspect of armed self- help (Dinstein 2001: 160). A closer reading of this assertion along with the consideration that the international system is anarchic (the lack of a higher authority than the state) leads us to the conclusion that self-defence is the “Trojan Horse” of power politics and of the Realist paradigm of international relations in the long and windy road towards the establishment of an international order based on justice and the rule of law. 

II.d Self- Defence as a right
	The development of the notion of a ‘right’ of self- defence in international law is inextricably linked with its corollary; the prohibition of aggression (Report of the International Law Commission 1980: 52). Until the time when war was formally prohibited in the twentieth century, ‘self-defence was not a legal concept but merely a political excuse for the use of force’ (Jimenez de Arechaga 1978: 96).  This was not something surprising in the time of the Clausewitzian instrument of war. As long as states were free to wage war for numerous reasons such as territorial expansion, colonial interests or even prestige, the issue of self –defence was restricted to a ‘meta juridical exercise’ (Dinstein 2001: 160).
	Nevertheless, today after two catastrophic World Wars, the use of force is permitted only in the form of defensive action. The exceptional and universally recognised right of self-defence is enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which dictates:
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Art. 51, UN Charter).
	According to this, a state can lawfully resort to force when it is the object of an armed attack. It was argued that self-defence is a de facto condition and not a right (Ago 1980: 53). As it was analysed before, however, self-defence qualifies as a genuine right with a clear normative content. Consequently, in Professor Dinstein’s terms ‘the thesis of self-defence as a legitimate recourse to force by Utopia is inextricably linked to the antithesis of the employment of unlawful force by Arcadia (its opponent)’ (2001: 162). This means that under no circumstances can the case of both fighting sides claiming self- defence be valid. In conformity with the structure of the rule and the respective right the lawful use of force can reside only at one party, for this kind of claim is mutually exclusive. Following the same logic ‘there can be no self-defence against self-defence’ as it was proclaimed by an American Military Tribunal in the 1949 Ministries case.
	Emmerich de Vattel, one of the greatest legal figures of his time and not only, supported at his The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law that ‘self-defence against an unjust attack is not only a right which every Nation has, but it is a duty, and one of its most sacred duties’ (1902 quoted in Dinstein 2001: 162). Such a view is inconsistent though with the rights- based explanation of defensive action. Self-defence is a right not a duty. There is nowhere in International Law any obligation of exercising self- defence (Zourek 1975: 51). Armed defence is one of the available options for a state when threatened by another power. A political compromise under certain conditions, though, may be a better solution than war for example in a conflict between a great power and a microstate. By this we don’t imply that surrendering is better than fighting back but rather that characterising self- defence as a duty would be impractical and absurd for it could theoretically lead to the case of state X charging state Y of not defending itself against state Z! As professor Dinstein accurately notices: ‘the idea that a State must sacrifice realism at the altar of conceptualism, and risk defeat while prodded on by a “sacred duty”, is incongruous’ (2001: 163).
	Another element of Article 51 that caused much controversy is the exact meaning of the adjective “inherent”. Does it imply that it is a natural right or is it a reference to its customary origin? The equally valid French text uses the term “natural” (droit naturel) an element that at first glance could mislead us in “natural law” explanations. An interpretation of this kind however is not accepted by modern scholars (Kelsen 1950: 791-2). Theorising about defensive rights as natural rights is more of a residue of the previous centuries when international law was read and often justified through the lens of religious doctrines. The right of self-defence derives its value as an international legal right via its regulation in positive law and through the practice of the states and rather not because of any higher quality rooted in nature.
 It was also supported that self- defence is inherent in the sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty however does not have a permanent set of qualities. It depends on the level of evolution that the international system has at a given time (Virally 1983: 79). Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt, sovereignty, like anarchy, is what states make of it (1992). In addition, a good example of the changing attributes of sovereignty is the perception about the right of the state to resort to war. In the nineteenth century and till the outbreak of the First World War going to war was considered ‘a right inherent in sovereignty itself’ (Hershey 1912: 349). As long as international law is formed and developed through the voluntary large scale practice of the states it is not prudent to attribute to certain notions like self-defence absolute qualities of an axiomatic sense. The correct and widely accepted interpretation of the term “inherent” is that which views it as belonging to general customary international law. This point of view was further reinforced by the landmark Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), where it was alleged by Nicaragua that the United States was supporting Contras in their war against the government of Nicaragua and was laying mines in the harbours of Nicaragua. The Court when engaging with the issue of this right concluded that the creators of the Charter acknowledged self-defence as a pre-existing right of a customary nature, which they desired to preserve (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 1986: 94). An immediate consequence of the recognition of the customary character of self- defence is the fact that it is attributable to every state regardless of its participation in the United Nations system. The roots of the customary international law of self- defence can be found at the Caroline incident of 1837 where the three fundamental conditions of lawful self-defence were established namely, necessity, proportionality and immediacy. However, due to its correlation and importance relating to the concepts of pre-emptive and preventive wars the Caroline case will be examined in detail at the second part of the present thesis.

II.e Self- Defence and the Domestic Analogy: some implications
	The domestic analogy is an argument which purports that there are certain common elements and similarities between domestic and international phenomena meaning that ‘the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level’ (Suganami 1989: 1). The influence of this way of thinking was recognised by renowned scholars such as Hans Morgenthau claiming: 'the application of domestic legal experience to international law is really the main stock in trade of modern international thought' (Morgenthau 1946: 113) and Charles Beitz who expressed the view that 'perceptions of international relations have been more thoroughly influenced by the analogy of states and persons than by any other device' (Beitz 1979: 179, 69). 
	The basic argument of the domestic analogy in reference to self-defence is that the rights of states can be explained and analysed on the model of the rights of persons. In both just war theory and its intellectual offspring, international law, this is a central notion. The essence of this argumentation was precisely expressed in the following way:  ‘the notions of self-defence and of just war are commonly linked: just wars are said to be defensive wars, and the justice of defensive wars is inferred from the right of personal self-defence’ (Lackey 1989:18). Nevertheless, it is necessary to stress that there are significant differences between the two levels. Inevitably, our thinking about self-defence in international politics is highly influenced by the way we perceive it in interpersonal relations, for this was the field were the concept was first articulated and systematically developed. This is why self-defence as it is established in domestic criminal legislations should serve as a foundation of reasoning and argumentation for international self-defence and not as a restrictive and limitative model which has to be implemented in interstate relations as well. No matter how tempting the domestic analogy seems, it would be a mistake to treat different conditions and qualities in a similar way. 




III. Striking First: Pre-emption vs. Prevention
 
Almost instinctively when we hear about a fight in our daily life and we want to make a judgement, the question that immediately rises is “who started first?”, for the initiator is usually considered the aggressor. Similarly, in cases of interstate conflicts and war the priority principle is highly influential. There are however some cases where the moral and legal status of striking first bares quite a few complex repercussions. This happens due to the fusion of the notion of self- defence with the realm of pre-emption and prevention. Pre-emptive and preventive reasoning is based on the “better now than later logic” which can be traced back to the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War (Levy 2008: 1). 
Despite being an old concept, the interest on preventive doctrines revitalised due to the war in Iraq in 2003 which is viewed as the culmination of the preventive doctrine of the Bush administration, articulated in the 2002 ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’. The effect of this text was not restricted only to the material consequences of the war. It was also a source of, deliberate or not, conceptual confusion. The use of the terms “pre-emptive and preventive” were used inconsistently and interchangeably having as a result the distortion of their meaning. The objective of this chapter is to provide a clear distinction between the two terms by analysing them, examining their attributes and identifying their conceptual differences. The cases of the Six Day War in 1967 and the Israeli attack at Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 will be used as exemplary illustrations of the two concepts.

III.a The concept of Pre-emptive War and the Caroline doctrine
	Pre-emption refers to the first use of military force when an enemy attack already is underway or, at the least, is very credibly imminent (Gray 2007: 8). Reduced to its essence, a pre-emptive attack is one that is launched based on the evident expectation that the adversary is about to attack, and that repelling the attack by striking first will be better than passively waiting for the first blow. The benefit of pre-empting the enemy attack is that it is expected to make the difference between victory and defeat, or at least minimising the damages of the upcoming conflict. ‘In either case, the fundamental consideration driving pre-emption is the belief that it is preferable to strike the first blow than to allow the enemy to do so’ (Mueller et al 2006: 6). In order for a pre-emptive strike to materialise a few basic conditions must take place. First, there must be an escalating crisis between two states. Both states must have the necessary material military capabilities for commencing an attack, in other words offensive capabilities. In addition, there must be actual preparations from the side of the aggressive state so that we can speak of an imminent attack and lastly the defending side should target in eliminating the enemy’s capacity of proceeding to the strike (Kurtulus 2007: 225).
	The debate over the justifiability of such an action is rooted back in the time of Grotius and Gentili. Both scholars agreed on the legitimacy of defensive wars but they parted ways when engaging with the justification of offensive action. Gentili a renowned legal scholar in Oxford stated that ‘an offensive war may be waged justly ... there is always a defensive aspect, if they are just’ (1933: 15). Furthermore he supported that wars can be fought in anticipation of ‘dangers already meditated and prepared’ but not yet launched (1933: 66). It is evident that Gentili was at odds with the age-old idea that those who strike first are prima facie in the wrong, even as he supports the idea that last resort is of key, although not of completely overriding, importance for determining when offensive war might be justified (May 2008: 77). On the other hand Grotius, the founder of International law for many, was sceptic with offensive wars, ‘those who accept fear of any sort as justifying anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived’ (1925: 173). Grotius was cautious about the confusion between pretext and cause in relevance to anticipatory attacks and this is why he insisted on the importance of imminence; ‘the danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point of time’ (1925: 173).
In the modern framework of the UN Charter the formulation of Article 51 that self-defence is permitted when an “armed attack occurs” served as the starting point of the contemporary debate whether pre-emptive action on the grounds of self-defence is justified and legal. The lack of a precise definition of armed attack enabled two conflicting strands to emerge. The first one, the ‘restrictionist’, claims that the purpose of Article 51 was explicitly to restrict the use of force in self-defence to these cases in which an armed attack has actually occurred. Therefore it would be illegal to resort to pre-emptive action. The potential victim ‘would first have to become an actual victim before it would be able to use military force in self-defence’ denying the broader interpretation of the term ‘inherent right’ as it is understood in customary law (Arend 2004: 23). On the other hand, the ‘counter- restrictionists’, support  that the reference in Article 51 to an “inherent right” is a clear indication of the survival of the broad pre-UN Charter customary right of anticipatory self-defence. The extremely limited reading of Article 51 seems to be impractical and self-contradictory for if states have first to suffer military attacks in order to resort to force ‘justifiable self-defence would then automatically qualify as a reprisal, inflicted after the attack was over. (Fletcher and Ohlin 2008: 172). The customary interpretation of the right which, although not universally accepted, is the most plausible derives its roots from the so-called Caroline Incident, where the necessary conditions of self-defence and in particular that of imminence were instilled. 
A historical account of the context from which the Caroline doctrine emerged will be quite helpful. Caroline was the name of a US steamboat. In 1837, there was an armed uprising (The Mackenzie rebellion) against British rule in Canada. The United states however were in peace with Great Britain at that time. The insurgents were using an American steamboat, the Caroline, to supply themselves from the US side of the Niagara River. On 29 December 1837, British troops boarded the ship, killed American members of the crew, set the ship on fire and allowed it to drift over the Niagara Falls. At the time of the attack the Caroline was docked on the US side of the border, not in its usual port on the Canadian side. The United States immediately protested against the attack, on the grounds that it violated its sovereignty, but the British claimed they were exercising their right to self-defence (Bellamy 2008: 78). At that point a debate started between the US secretary of State, John Forsyth and his British counterpart. In early 1938 the American side characterised the attack an ‘extraordinary outrage’ whereas the British accused the US of not preventing the use of its territory by the Canadian rebels and justifying the attack as ‘a necessity of self-defence and self-preservation’ against the ‘piratical’ vessel (Stevens 2004: 24-25). After a small interval, in late 1840, a former British soldier was arrested and charged with arson and murder in relation to the Caroline incident. ‘The US government invited the British to apologize for the incident and pay compensation in return for the dismissal of charges against the soldier. The British Minister agreed immediately and despatched a note of apology to the US government’ (Bellamy 2008: 79, Stevens 2004: 25). In an 1842 reply, the US Secretary of State Daniel Webster concluded on the issue of self-defence, in his much quoted phrase, that Britain was required to ‘show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’ (Webster 1983: 67). Furthermore, he added that the action taken must also involve ‘nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it’ (Webster 1983: 68). Hence, according to international customary law, a state in order to claim the right to pre-emptive self- defence has to demonstrate the imminence of an attack, the necessity of pre-emption and the proportionality of its intended response (Bellamy 2008: 79). Indeed, throughout the period before the UN Charter, it was generally held that the criteria of imminence, necessity and proportionality set the standard for permissible pre-emptive action. If a state could ‘demonstrate necessity (in the sense that the enemy state was about to engage in an armed attack) and act proportionately, then pre-emptive self-defence would be legal’ (Arend 2004: 22). 
For Michael Walzer however, one of the greatest just war theorists of modern times, the Websterian approach to pre-emptive self-defence is not as clear-cut and helpful as it initially seems. In his words ‘pre-emption on this view is like a reflex action, a throwing up of one's arms at the very last minute. But it hardly requires much of a "showing" to justify a movement of that sort’ (2006: 75). Anticipatory action for him should be viewed as a spectrum spanning from the restrictive Websterian formula at the one end to the logic of preventive war to the other. The key point however in Walzer’s perception on pre-emption is the point where we draw the line in reference to the legality or illegality of a first strike. In his opinion, that point should not be based on the notion of the ‘imminent attack’ but rather on the idea of ‘sufficient threat’ (2006: 81). He clarified this by describing it as a clear ‘manifest intent to injure’, a sufficient level of ‘active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger’ and a general condition in which staying passive or inactive ‘greatly magnifies the risk’ (Walzer 2006: 81). Nevertheless, in relation to the timeframe of this concept, he admits that he cannot specify a time span and he simply refers to it as ‘the present’. Such a lack of precision though on a significant aspect of the pre-emptive reasoning (time), makes it hard to set a robust distinctive limit or line between the often confusing notions of pre-emption and prevention and thus exposes him to the respective criticism. Nonetheless, he tries to illustrate his conceptualisation of a pre-emptive war by referring to the example of the Six Days War. Despite the possible differences with the Walzerian approach on the issue the same case will be used as a practical example of the implementation of the doctrine of pre-emptive war.

III.b The Six Day War
The Six Day War or “the June 1967 War” as it is called in Arab sources (Oren 2002)  is not only a pivotal point in the contemporary  history of the Middle East, but also a hallmark in a conceptual development, that of the gradual broadening of the concept of  pre-emptive war (Kurtulus 2007: 220). The Six Day War was not an isolated event. It was part of a series of wars between Israel and their Arab neighbours since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. The war in 1967 claims a central place in the history of these conflicts, given the overwhelming Israeli success and mostly the manner it was achieved; using pre-emption (Flynn 2008: 184). Without a doubt wars have long moral and political backgrounds. ‘Anticipation’, however, ‘needs to be understood within a narrower frame’ (Walzer 2006: 82).
The crisis started with a sudden escalation sparked by Soviet intelligence reports about an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. The inaccuracy of these reports was almost without delay testified by United Nations observers on the scene. On May 14, the Israelis detected Egyptian troops crossing the Suez Canal and moving into the Sinai Peninsula. Three days later Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UNEF that had served as a buffer in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt. On May 22, he announced his intention to close the Straits of Tiran, and did so the following day (Oren 2002: 83). In the aftermath of the Suez War of 1956, the Straits had already been recognized as an international waterway by the international community. It did not require much of consideration that such a move would constitute a casus belli, given that the Israelis on many occasions stated that they would regard it so (Walzer 2006: 83).  Less than a week after the start of the crisis the situation had become very explosive: the Israeli decision makers speculated about a possible Egyptian surprise attack on the Dimona nuclear reactor (Oren 2002: 75-76). In addition, Nasser in a public speech contributed to the culmination of the Israeli perception of the incoming threat by stating on May 28 that, ‘We plan to open a general assault on Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel’ (Hammel 1992: 36).  This series of events was viewed as a provocation by Israel, which then became convinced of the Egyptian intentions to attack it. Despite initial hesitations by part of the Israeli cabinet, mainly because of a lack of an explicit US support in case of a pre-emptive strike, the Israeli operation commenced on June 5, 1967, starting at 7:45 Israeli time and attacking in successive waves. Israel practically destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, several Egyptian tanks and reached the Suez Canal. At the same time, Israel had defeated and successfully removed Jordanian forces from the west bank of the Jordan River. It captured the Golan Heights from Syria as Israeli forces moved in on Syrian territory (Anand 2009: 75). The success of the Israeli military was overwhelming. 
The reaction of the international community was rather cautious. After being notified for the occurrence of the attack by both sides, the Security Council issued a Resolution 233 of 6 June 1967 which put no blame on either party and called upon ‘the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area’. A second Soviet-led resolution followed the following day with similar content. Regarding the Israeli argument of pre-emptive self-defence based on the dangers created by the sudden withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai at Egypt’s command and the blockade of the Tiran Straits, the Council ‘carefully refrained from either apportioning blame or granting exculpation’ (Franck 2004: 102). 
Since then the Six Day War serves as a textbook example of pre-emptive war in the relevant literature. Nevertheless, alternative interpretations exist. Professor Malcolm Shaw asserts that ‘it could of course, be argued that the Egyptian blockade itself constituted the use of force, thus legitimising Israeli actions without the need for ‘anticipatory’ conceptions of self-defence’ (Shaw 1991: 694). Such a view though is hard to be adopted given that Israel had not yet been attacked militarily when it launched its first strikes. Others (Kurtulus 2007, Reiter 1995) disagree on the grounds that although the Israeli attack was anticipatory in nature it did not fulfil the criteria of pre-emption and leaned more towards prevention. They base their conclusions mostly on the fact that as most scholars adhere nowadays Nasser did not actually have intent of striking first but rather was behaving on the margins of brinkmanship (Shlaim 2001: 237). Approaches of this kind however are influenced by the benefit of hindsight and distance themselves from the actual conditions of those specific moments. The whole strategic setting of the crisis for Israel (surrounded by enemy forces, unfavourable geographic conditions, threatening actions such as the blockade) created the necessary signals of an imminent war. Therefore Israel assumed that its only chance for survival lied on pre-emption and given the circumstances its action was not unreasonable. That was also the conclusion reached by most states based on evidence available to them. In Franck’s own words: ‘it does recognizes that in demonstrable circumstances of extreme necessity, anticipatory self-defence may be a legitimate exercise of a state’s right to ensure its survival’ (2004: 105).  Indeed, the criterion of imminence could be objectively inferred by the threatened side based on material and contextual factors leading them consequently to the forced choice of striking first in contrast to the more cool headed considerations and calculations when choosing the right moment for a preventive war.  

III.c The Concept of Preventive War
Preventive war shares the same conceptual matrix as pre-emption. They both derive from the “sooner than later” logic but the content of the two concepts differs significantly. In Hew Strachan’s words: ‘pre-emption was an idea that grew from the operational level of war; it was a military concept, whereas preventive war was a political one… the initiation of war for fear of deterioration in the military balance between the two sides’ (Strachan 2007: 27). An old proverb says: ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’. Attacking an adversary who may develop into a serious threat at some point in the future can be both tempting and powerful a notion. Experimental studies in political psychology show that people appear to be ‘sensitive to losses and gains around a reference point, which they frequently define as the current status quo’ (Raymond and Kegley 2008: 102). In addition they tend to overestimate losses relative to comparable gains, and seem to be more risk prone when preventing the deterioration of the status quo rather than when trying to improve it. Consequently, when leaders confront a potential danger to the current stable conditions and consider that inaction will result in a loss, ‘the gamble of taking preventive military action becomes alluring, even though the outcome may prove injurious in the long run’ (Raymond and Kegley 2008: 103). 
Almost every scholar on the field provided his own definition of preventive war. For example Samuel Huntington perceived it as: ‘a military action initiated by one state against another for the purpose of forestalling a subsequent change in the balance of power between the two states which would seriously reduce the military security of the first state’ (1957: 360). Levy argued on similar lines saying that the ‘preventive motivation’ is founded on the ‘perception that one’s military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary, and from the fear of the consequences of that decline’ (1987: 87). Walzer’s version is also evolving round the balance of power (2006: 76). Focusing however only on the concept of the balance of power in defining prevention (as the conventional explanations do) is a rather limited and unhelpful approach. For maintaining such a balance is only one possible motivation for prevention and not its definitional characteristic. In other words, wars for the balance of power may be preventive wars but not all preventive wars take place for the sake of the balance of power. Preventive motivations may vary. Hence a more concise definition would argue that: ‘a preventive action is one fought to forestall a grave national security threat’ and additionally, true prevention is a response to ‘a serious threat that lies in the future, not an attack that is already underway’ (in contrast to pre-emption) (Renshon 2006: 4). The element of imminence is what makes the difference in the case of preventive war. Immediate threats as understood in the case of pre-emption are relatively easier to be assessed and demonstrated to the rest of the international community.  Assessing the opponent’s future intentions though tends to be a far more difficult task. When dealing with future longer-term threats that may require preventive war, ‘the capabilities that matter are those that will exist in the future, and forecasting these naturally tends to involve a great degree of uncertainty’ (Mueller et al. 2006: 10). Furthermore, fears that rival states will inevitably attack in the long run tend to be based not on specific intelligence regarding their long-term plans, but instead on ‘general models that attribute aggression to patterns of power distribution, geopolitics, or particular leaders, ideologies, or regime types’ (Mueller et al. 2006: 10). It is clear that considerations of preventive wars are intertwined with subjective perceptions of a combination of possibilities and probabilities. 
Preventive war is a fine example of what Clausewitz had in mind when he was describing war as ‘politics by other means’. Preventive wars are wars of choice not of necessity. Preventive thinking may start because of the perception of a certain threat but it is the preventer who decides when and under what circumstances to strike (Levy 2008: 4). Unlike pre-emptive action where the conditions are not shaped by the pre-emptor but the initial aggressor, preventive action is the outcome of thorough political calculations and strategic considerations. It is the established opinion in the relevant literature that the key difference between pre-emption and prevention is the element of imminence. Imminence however is open to various interpretations. It is argued that time proximity of the potential threat is what imminence is all about (Crawford 2003: 31). This is highly debatable at least. Imminence must be viewed as a complex multidimensional concept. It is the combination of certain factors. Timing, actual military capabilities, manifested intent of using these capabilities, the exhaustion of any other peaceful means of conflict resolution and the nature of danger should be taken into account when evaluating the imminence of a certain threat. 
The task of approaching descriptively the concept of preventive war will be concluded below by illustrating it with reference to the Israeli attack at the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981. Its normative evaluation and in particular its legitimacy on the grounds of self- defence which is the central question of the present work will be examined in the next chapter.


III.d The case of the Israeli attack on the Osirak Reactor
	The 1981 Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor constitutes the clearest manifestation of preventive action. Security concerns of the Israeli side about Iraq turned into fear when Iraq was proceeding to decisive steps towards the nuclear threshold. For Israeli officials the possibility of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons would not only be a destabilising development for the regional fragile balance of power but most importantly an existential threat for the state of Israel. As Ariel Sharon noted: ‘For us it is not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival’ (Feldman 1982: 122).
	The context that led to this highly significant incident will give us a better picture of its preventive nature and its repercussions. Israeli concerns about a possible Iraqi nuclear capability started in the 1970’s almost concomitantly with the rise of Saddam Hussein to power. In addition there were some indicators that intensified Israeli anxiety. Apart from an increase in Iraq’s military arsenal, including the acquisition of bombers that could be equipped with nuclear warheads capable of reaching Israel, they were worried by Iraq’s initial desire to purchase the costly but plutonium-producing gas graphite power reactor from France along with the purchase of a 70 mw Material Testing Reactor. Such an action was rather odd for a state not involved in the indigenous production of power reactors. Furthermore, Iraq’s persistence that the Osirak reactor be fuelled by highly enriched weapon grade uranium rather than by less-enriched “Caramel” fuel and the import of plutonium-separation ‘hot-cell’ simulators from Italy made Israel believe that the Iraqi nuclear programme was nothing but weapons orientated (Feldman 1982: 115). 
According to calculations in Israel, Iraq could develop nuclear weapons by 1985 or even earlier. Hence for Israel the debate was not about whether Iraq was striving to achieve nuclear status; this was taken for granted. The real debate was on the policy that was most suitable for the case; prevention or deterrence (Levy 2008: 12). Deterrence was not considered as very efficient given that Arab conventional superiority had reached a ratio of five to one, Israel was not confident that US power would be a reliable guarantee of Israeli security and lastly the Iraqi nuclear capability would neutralise their nuclear advance due to the unfavourable geographic conditions which precluded a second strike capability (Feldman 1982, Levy 2008: 12). Prevention appeared as the only option. For example the director-general of Begin’s office, M. Shumuelevitch, added that ‘‘Israel cannot sit and wait for an Iraqi bomb to fall on its head’ (Renshon 2006: 50). At that point, Prime Minister Begin tried to emphasise the threat even more by evoking analogies to the Holocaust strengthening the already inherent bad faith relationship between the two states. Another crucial factor leading to the decision to strike was domestic politics. The logic of prevention was not accepted by all sides in Israel. Labour Opposition leader Shimon Peres was against a preventive action because of the immense consequences it could have for Israel’s international status. In a letter to Begin on 10 May 1981 Peres expressed his fear that such an act would result in Israel’s alienation from the international community making Israel ‘like a tree in the desert’ (Perlmutter et al. 2003: 59). Consequently, Begin was convinced that in case he lost in the upcoming elections the preventive option would be abandoned and then it would be too late. In addition, estimates reported that the reactor would start functioning in mid- July and thus the window of opportunity for a strike without a collateral radioactive fallout, in an attempt to minimise international criticism, would close for ever (Levy 2008: 13). Finally in October 1980 the Israeli cabinet decided (with votes ten to six) to proceed to the attack (Mueller et al. 2006: 215).
Operationally the raid was a success. The air strike was delivered on Sunday, June 6, 1981. A total of eight newly delivered F-16A fighter bombers, each carrying two 2,200-pound bombs, escorted by six F-15A fighters, flew more than 650 miles across Jordanian and Saudi airspace and into Iraq at low level in order to avoid detection. They hit the target at dusk and destroyed the facility before they returned back without any implications. The death toll counted nine Iraqis and one French technician (McKinnon 1987, Mueller et al. 2006: 215).
The reaction of the international community was negative. Israel’s position was that it ‘was exercising its inherent and natural right of self-defence, as understood in general international law and well within the meaning of Article 51 of the [UN] Charter’ (Arend 2004: 26). However this argumentation was nothing but convincing even with a broad interpretation of the Caroline standards. The Sierra Leonean delegate accurately asserted that ‘The Israeli action was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and prepared and was plainly an act of aggression’. The majority concluded that there was no necessity for self-defence, there was no immediacy of self-protection and that Israel violated Iraq’s sovereignty while the Security Council without being vetoed by the USA, condemned the attack with the Resolution 487 of 1981 (Anand 2009: 78).
The fundamental question that concerned the scholars and the politicians who engaged with the issue is the impact of the attack on the evolution of the Iraqi nuclear programme.  Proponents of the attack claim that the strike prevented the development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability (Tamsett 2004, Feldman 1982).Whereas critics argue that the strike accelerated and boosted Iraq’s nuclear efforts, pointing to the establishment of a clandestine weapons program in the aftermath of 1981 (Reiter 2005, Betts 2006, Braut- Heghammer 2011). Reality and the development of history give credit to the latter. Braut- Heghammer in his thorough and incisive piece shows that:
‘Iraq’s initial efforts to explore a nuclear weapons option lacked the characteristics of a formal nuclear weapons program: the Iraqis had no explicit mandate, no dedicated organizational infrastructure, no budget, and no strategic plan. The notion of a nuclear weapons option remained an abstraction’ (2011: 107).







IV. PREVENTIVE SELF- DEFENCE

‘‘Better to be rid at once of someone who does not yet threaten you, than leave him alive so that he may threaten you one day.’’
Umberto Eco, Baudolino

IV.a The 2002 National Security Strategy and the expansion of Self -Defence
September 11, 2001 was a pivotal event not only for the United States but for the world in general. Apart from the horrific immediate consequences, costing the lives of thousands of innocent people, its further repercussions and influence on the conduct of US foreign policy is of immense significance. President Bush along with British Prime Minister Blair openly expressed their concern that the interaction between transnational terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear proliferation poses a novel threat that demands a revision of the best way of response. More precisely, they proposed that the criteria and the limits of self-defence need to be re-evaluated in order to coincide with the changing nature of contemporary threats (O’Driscoll 2008: 27). 
The core rationale of the argument was that the right of self-defence should be viewed in an expanded form covering preventive action. The issue of prevention started to gain momentum concomitantly with the built-up for the war in Iraq. The hallmark of the new US policy was ‘The National Security Strategy of the USA’ (NSS), published in September 2002. This text epitomised the way the US perceived the most appropriate way to deal with the emerging threats in the changing international environment. The United States would not tolerate being threatened by any dangerous regime and therefore would take the offensive to their enemies. ‘To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively (NSS 2002: 14-16). Elsewhere in the same text, it is argued that the existing right of self-defence is based ‘on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack’ (NSS 2002: 14-16). Given this alleged inadequacy of this conception of self- defence, the strategy calls for a widening of ‘the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’ (NSS 2002:14-16). In addition, the lethal combination of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, WMD’s and rogue states, makes the costs of inaction unbearable. Hence, the compelling need to ‘take anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’ (NSS 2002, Simpson and Wheeler 2007: 116). 
It is clear that the Bush Doctrine promotes a more permissive and relaxed approach to anticipatory war than it is established both in international law and Just War tradition by arguing, as O’Driscoll notes, that ‘a threat may give rise to a right of self-defence even before that threat has fully materialized, where previously such a right only arose in the face of a clear and present danger or an imminent threat’ (2008:28). Such a formulation of the legal right to self-defence differs significantly from the restrictive criteria established by the Caroline case, and mirrors a new US policy of preventive and not pre-emptive war despite the confusing use of terminology in the NSS. The question that rises though is about the purpose and the effect in terms of legitimacy of this Preventive Doctrine. Is it a law changing attempt or a manifestation of American exceptionalism? (Simpson and Wheeler 2007: 116). 

IV.b The quest for legitimacy
Preventive thinking in general and in the United States in particular was not a novelty (Strachan 2007, Trachtenberg 2007). The explicit adoption though and the implementation of a large scale preventive doctrine by the Bush administration triggered a series of debates with the one about its legitimacy at the epicentre. The prospect of the use of the unmatched American military power based on a unilateral subjective perception of imminent threat undoubtedly poses the question of how it could be justified; on which authority could this justification be founded? As Martin Wight accurately asserted: 'The fundamental problem of politics is the justification of power...Power is not self-justifying; it must be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond itself, and thus be transformed into "authority"’ (Wight 1991: 99).





IV.c Preventive War and Self-Defence as Parallel Lines
Regardless the politics of legitimacy, meaning the effectiveness and the acceptance of the US arguments about prevention by the international community, what is really important is the core of the argument enshrined in the NSS. Are the concepts of self-defence and preventive war compatible in the first place? In other words, is it legitimate to justify the use of preventive force on the grounds of self-defence?
The argument put forward here is that these two concepts are incompatible in their essence. Both preventive war and self-defence share a common foundation or a common goal; the logic of protection. The best way to view them though is that of two parallel lines. Despite pointing to the same direction, they move in parallel and they can never intersect due to the differences and particularities of their structure. Self-defence in spite of its broad moral content is developed and treated as a legal concept and legal notions inescapably are associated with justifications based on facts and proof. On the other hand, preventive war with its political roots distances itself from the realm of objectively observed facts and leans more towards subjective perception founded on future orientated abstract thinking.  Inevitably, when leaders consider preventive action they have to deal with cost-benefit calculations under the shadow of future uncertainty and potentially dangerous probabilities. As Hannah Arendt observed ‘Predictions of the future are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if men do not act and if nothing unexpected happens’ (1969: 7). Therefore one first factor of incompatibility between the two concepts is the degree of certainty that they each rely on. In other words, the key point here lies on the criteria of self-defence and particularly that of imminence. Imminence, in the multidimensional sense described above, is the qualitative element that separates the two concepts. Self-defence in its context is justified among other things as a measure of last resort triggered by the imminent danger posed by the adversary. In order to speak of a danger or a threat of this kind its existence must be proven in a demonstrable and apprehensible way. A materialised threat is what it takes to change the characterisation of an action from simply precautionary to an act of self- defence.
 Preventive war aiming to confront a future, not yet imminent and materialised threat clearly lacks this quality. This is one of the reasons why international legal scholars especially, are reluctant to accept the legitimacy of such a doctrine, hence the necessary distinction between pre-emptive and preventive wars. Both pre-emption and prevention may share the common “better now than later logic” but prevention incorporates another broader notion as well; that of “just in case”. This is the context in which Donald Rumsfeld’s famous quote ‘Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’ can be better understood when he advocated in favour of the Iraq war (Albright 2006:198). Pre-emption can be viewed as a tactical advantage, securing the element of surprise at an already set and imminent conflict, whereas in the case of preventive war as Raymond and Kegley argue, the Bush administration were applying ‘the so-called “precautionary principle” from the field of environmental risk analysis to national security policy’ (2008: 105).
The National Security Strategy of 2002 proposed a new expansive reading of the right of self-defence up to the point of covering preventive war as a response to the evolving nature of threats worldwide. This would happen by relaxing the criterion of imminence to the point of actually eliminating it, for a threat would be imminent, according to the NSS logic, if it is perceived so by the concerned state. Nevertheless the right of self- defence as it is understood both at the domestic and the international level is of an exceptional nature. Differently put, self-defence serves as an exception to the general rule of the prohibition of the use of force. By definition exceptions are special cases which challenge the general rule and for this reason it is established in jurisprudence that they should be approached in a restrictive way, otherwise a conflation between rule and exception would occur. Of course, this restrictive approach should be balanced so as to be actually applicable and effective. For example, article 51 of the UN Charter, as it was demonstrated before, is successfully interpreted with the help of the existing customary law standards in order not to constitute neither “a suicide pact” with its highly restricted interpretation, demanding the actual occurrence of an attack, nor a pretext for concealed aggression based on a too relaxed reading and misuse of the imminence criterion. Such a cautious understanding of the defensive right is also necessary for maintaining its moral and justificatory value. By setting as a requirement that self-defence must be undertaken only when an unjust attack is imminent, as Rodin notes, ‘the condition guarantees that those who are subject to defensive force are morally liable to it because they are currently engaged in an unjust aggressive attack’ (2007: 175). It is clear, that the condition of imminence has an essential role in the theory of self- defence and that preventive self-defence is thereby ruled out at the level of moral theory (Rodin 2007: 175). 
Another implication of the contentious Bush Doctrine is the conceptual stretching of self-defence. In terms of justification, the more it is distanced from facts and objectively identified conditions the more difficult it gets to distinguish prevention from aggression. In case preventive war would be a legitimate manifestation of self-defence then almost every use of force could be justified as such given that ultimately every state would be the judge of its own cause based on a hard to verify perception of a future threat; making the distinction between aggression and defence lose its meaning. This is one of the reasons behind the establishment of the Security Council. It may be accused often correctly for its inadequacy, but its creation was conceived on the grounds that no state can be trusted with the decision of the recourse to force on its own, for the room for abuse would be plenty.  
The argument for preventive war is largely consequentialist. Simply put it ‘defends a state of affairs worth defending (such as one's own security), and fighting the war now is a better bet than fighting it later’ (Luban 2004: 223). The value of this argument is criticised even by proponents of restricted conceptions of preventive action such as Luban and Walzer. For Walzer his main objection is not only that preventive war would make war-fighting too frequent, but that it would make it too ordinary because doctrines like this ‘radically underestimate the importance of the shift from diplomacy to force. They don't recognize the problem that killing and being killed poses’ (Walzer 200: 77). Furthermore David Luban in an attempt to interpret Walzer asserts that ‘that mere speculation about future danger can never justify the real inevitability of killing and being killed in a preventive war’ adding that ‘the doctrine of preventive war makes war too much part of politics as usual’ (Luban 2004: 224). In rule-consequentialist terms, thus, prevention is rejected according to these two scholars because a moral or legal rule permitting preventive war legitimizes wars under conditions too close to the routinization of aggression. Even Kissinger warned ‘it cannot be either in American national interests or the world’s interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of pre-emption against its own definition of threats to its security’ for it would legitimately permit India and Pakistan to attack each other for example (2002). Preventive doctrines are too permissive due to the broadening of the category of permissible wars and the fact that it constitutes rival states legitimate targets of each other's preventive wars.
Luban however defends a restricted preventive doctrine according to which ‘preventive war is permitted to be launched by potential victims of a rogue state's aggressive attack, but not by third parties’ and with the presupposition that a preventive war is ‘a pre-emptive war in which the imminence requirement is recast from temporal to probabilistic terms’ (2004: 230-232). According to the same logic thinking in probabilistic rather than temporal terms about the imminence of an attack ‘means regarding the attack as a sure thing once its likelihood surpasses some imminence threshold (say a probability of 80 per cent) rather than regarding it as imminent if it is going to happen tomorrow or next week’ (2004: 233). No matter how tempting such an approach may seem, it hides an inherent conceptual flaw and an inability to escape the imperative influence of subjective perception. The measurement of a probabilistic limit on which an attack may be considered imminent is misleading. In reality, when considering the probability of an attack by a rogue state or an adversary in general, the chances are fifty- fifty for there are only two possible results; an attack or an absence of attack. There is no other option. Any other measurement of threat probabilities is the result of the perceptual interpretation of the past record of the given rogue along with a future projection of a potential sequence of events. Therefore, Luban’s version is hardly any different than the usual preventive thinking.
The argumentative basis of the NSS is the asymmetrical and unconventional nature of the emerging threat of terrorism, making the need to resort to prevention compelling. At first glance this line of thinking seems quite plausible but if we examine it thoroughly we will see that this is not exactly the case. Consistent to its inconsistency the NSS mingles rogue states, terrorist groups and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the same melting pot. Such a move however inevitably leads to misled conclusions. It is clear that the right of self- defence in the international level is conceived and developed in an interstate contextual basis. In other words, Article 51 UN Charter and the relevant customary parameters are constructed having interstate conflicts as their only model. Having this in mind we can argue that in relation to the threat posed by the so-called rogue states the current legal environment does not call for a reformulation. The counter argument though supports that in the era of inter-ballistic missiles nuclear weapons and WMD’s waiting for clear signs of troop mobilisations is futile for a disastrous attack could take place out of sudden in a matter of minutes. This condition however is not unprecedented. We cannot help but share Simpson and Wheeler’s rhetoric question: ‘Is the United States really more vulnerable today than it was during the Cold War, when Soviet missiles could have wiped out millions of Americans in less than 30 minutes?’ (2007: 120). In his May 1 speech at the National Defence University, Bush pointed that ‘Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.… Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation’ (2001). For him the soviet danger was completely different from the new dangerous terrorist mix. Here lies the basic flaw of this logic. As far as states are concerned, containment through deterrence would still work in the same way it operated against the Soviet Union. In the same speech Bush argued that ‘today’s most urgent threat stems from… small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life’ (2001). This argument is neutralised though by evoking the tested Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (MAD) according to which ‘if the blackmailer and the target state both have nuclear weapons, however, the blackmailer's threat is an empty one because the blackmailer cannot carry out the threat without triggering his own destruction’ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003: 58). It may be argued that rogue leaders are unpredictable or irrational and that we cannot be sure how far they can get but as Mearsheimer and Walt showed when considering the case of Saddam Hussein, dictators value two things more than anything else; staying alive and holding their grip to power. This is why nuclear deterrence worked for the past seventy years and it is effective even against rogue states (2003: 59). It is evident that this aspect of the emerging threat hardly requires a radical preventive strategic turn. 
The other pillar of the terrorist threat is also founded on a flawed conception. Despite acknowledging the asymmetrical nature of the terrorist threat, the NSS proposes a response which is based on the conventional interstate model, confronting terrorist networks as if they were states and thus evoking the right of self-defence. If we add the fact that it is virtually impossible for a liberal democracy to guard against terrorism at all times and in all places then this flawed starting point leads us to the conclusion that ‘the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them’ (Rumsfeld 2001). Terrorist networks though are not states and the dangers they bear are of a quite distinctive nature.  International terrorism and WMD proliferation are global problems and only the global community as a whole can effectively act to resolve them (Guoliang 2004: 79). Engaging into preventive wars in order to eradicate terrorism would result to a never ending process for the means are not suitable to the end. The most appropriate way of dealing with terrorism and clandestine nuclear proliferation apart from eliminating the general root causes of violence, is to strengthen international cooperation on the model of interstate cooperation against international crime along with the enhancement of non-proliferation projects such as the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In an era were terrorist networks can be diffused throughout the world unilateral protection through preventive wars will result to a chimeric chase failing to eradicate the threat eventually for as it was demonstrated in the example of the Israeli attack to Osirak preventive action only manages to postpone the potential danger and not completely eliminate it unless it is accompanied with the eradication of the root causes of the initial aggression.
This part of the thesis showed that by definition the concepts of self- defence and preventive war can never intersect due to their discrepancy regarding the imminence factor. It is true that prevention can be driven by defensive motives but motivation only is not enough for it to be legitimately justified on the grounds of self-defence. This is why it is argued here that they move in parallel tracks. Any attempt though to fuse the two concepts into that of preventive self-defence would result to the distortion of the original moral and normative content of each one of them.

V. Conclusion
	Gentili in his effort to argue in favour of anticipatory defence employed a metaphor, borrowing it from Philo, ‘we kill a snake as soon as we see one, even though it has not injured us and will perhaps not harm us. For thus we protect ourselves before it attacks us’ (1933: 61). This alluring analogy may be instructive on the virtue of precaution; its applicability however in international politics is a recipe for instability and violence. Indeed, the dangerous repercussions of preventive war are one of the argumentative pillars of this dissertation. The analysis evolved around the troubling question of the concordance between self-defence and prevention or alternatively of the content and the legitimacy of preventive self- defence.
	In order to thoroughly assess the interaction of these two composing concepts (self-defence and preventive war) it was imperative to understand the subject matter of each one. Hence, the first part was dedicated to the examination of the nature of self-defence. It was approached not only through the traditional lens of international law but relying on the work of David Rodin it was also its moral content that was investigated. In particular, it was self-defence’s function as a genuine right independent from consequentialist considerations and as a guide for identifying aggression that was exhibited (Rodin 2002). The complexity of this exercise laid on the fact that self-defence is part of the domestic analogy in international politics and maintaining a functional and efficient balance between domestic and international influences is of high significance. Thus it is argued that conceptions of personal defence should be viewed as a useful starting point for national defence argumentation but at the same time adjusted to the particularities of the international realm.  
	The second part was dedicated to the element of anticipation. The mentality of striking first despite being present for as long as war is part of human life still generates a great debate in reference to its legitimacy and morality. The terminological conflation provoked by the 2002 NSS concerning the notions of pre-emption and prevention made it imperative to clarify and restore the actual meaning of each one in order to clearly appreciate their relevant differences and qualities. With the assistance of a sound interpretation of the right of self-defence based on customary principles (Caroline case) it was shown that pre-emption qualified as a legitimate manifestation of defensive action. The historical illustration of the Six Day War served as an actual example for the comprehension of the special circumstances surrounding pre-emptive self-defence. Another historical example, the Israeli raid at Osirak worked as model for the practical description of the most controversial version of anticipation; that of prevention.  
	The normative evaluation of preventive war and the argument regarding its legitimacy in relation to self-defence was the epicentre of the final part. This dissertation proposes the idea of the parallel nature of the concepts in question. Due to definitional deviations they can never intersect despite pointing to a common direction; that of self- protection. Preventive war as Colin Gray asserts ‘is to shoot on suspicion’ (Gray 2007: 16). The criterion of imminence is either abandoned completely or stretched so far that it eventually loses any practical meaning, whereas for self-defence imminence is a condition sine qua non.
	Proponents of preventive doctrines (general or limited) such as Luban, acknowledging the serious long term implications of a universal right to recourse to preventive force and the impossibility of such a right to accommodate to the current international legal order and international society in general, promote the idea of a justified ‘double standard’ in favour of the only superpower in the world (Luban 2004: 241). By relying on the anarchic nature of the international system and the current uneven and unbalanced distribution of power within it, it is supported that the USA with its unmatched military, economic, and cultural power should create a new permissive normative order where she will be privileged with the ‘exclusive right to determine when anticipatory self-defence is legitimate impugning the legal principle that no one may be a judge in his own cause’ (Kegley and Raymond 2003: 391-392). Accordingly a renewed legitimate order beyond the Walzerian ‘legalist paradigm’ would be created, granting immunity to the USA from the effect of international law. But such a system could hardly evoke any legal principles for it cancels any rational notion of any kind of legal system. A basic function of any legal system, including the international one, is to protect the weak from predatory or arbitrary action by the strong. Consequently allowing the strong to be exempted from the rule of law or having a free-pass at will, indicates a failed system (Rodin 2007: 159). In other words, the double standard argument is implicitly promoting the notion of ‘might makes right’ and inevitably reminding us of Thucydides when he noted that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’ (1996). A development to this direction is evident that leads to backward results cancelling the laborious, yet imperfect, efforts to ameliorate the effects of international anarchy and to reduce the occurrence of war, especially in the United Nations era, permitting the flourishing of power politics.
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